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WHAT KULCH ACCOMPLISHED; WHAT KULCH LEFT OUT
An analysis of the rights of terminated whistleblowers in Ohio, as
mandated by section 4113.52 of the Ohio Revised Code and interpreted
by Kuich v. Structural Fibers, Inc., 677 N.E.2d 308 (Ohio 1997).
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I. INTRODUCTION
At first glance, it may not seem completely unfair. An employee alerts the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), the government's
watchdog in the employment arena, that he is experiencing health problems
as a result of possible code violations by his employer. Then, upon inspection,
OSHA finds that while there are no violations that link to the employee's health
problems, other unrelated violations do exist and substantial penalties are
levied. Subsequently, the reporting employee, now considered a
whistleblower, is no longer welcome at that workplace, and is eventually
terminated or quits. The general rule is that an at-will employee can be
discharged at any time for any or no reason, even in "gross or reckless disregard
of any employee's rights."3
But this is not the case in Ohio. In the later half of the twentieth century, the
wrongful discharge exception to the employment at-will doctrine developed.
Under this doctrine, an employer who wrongfully discharges an employee in
violation of a clearly expressed public policy, which usually requires being
grounded in statute, will be subject to an action for damages.4 To the benefit of
1Student, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law; B.A. Ohio University.
2professor, Legal Writing, Research, and Advocacy Cleveland-Marshall College of
Law, Cleveland State University; J.D. Cleveland-Marshall College of Law; B.A.
Baldwin-Wallace College.
3Collins v. Rizkana, 652 N.E.2d 653, 656 (1995).
4 1d. at 656.
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our terminated employee, the Ohio legislature has recognized the public policy
concerning discharging whistleblowers. In response, it enacted section 4113.52
of the Ohio Revised Code, commonly called Ohio's Whistleblower Statute,
which expressly allows the terminated whistleblower to maintain a cause of
action against his employer.5
The Ohio Supreme Court has now, in Kzlch v. Structural Fibers, Inc.,6
furthered this policy interest by stating the remedies available in Ohio's
Whistleblower Statute alone do not adequately compensate the discharged
whistleblower. In order to remedy this inadequate compensation problem, the
court has decided to allow the terminated whistleblower to bring a common
law action for wrongful discharge in addition to the cause of action brought
under Ohio's Whistleblower Statute. The court has determined that this
common law cause of action will provide a more complete array of remedies
to more fully compensate the aggrieved whistleblower.
While the court clearly defined the discharged whistleblower's remedies, it
failed to properly address exactly what remedies he is entitled to recover. The
court ruled that the remedies available under the statutory and common law
actions are to be cumulative, while also stating that the discharged
whistleblower is not entitled to double recovery.7 Although theories of the
court's intent are introduced, it appears as if it is now left to Ohio's courts to
interpret the supreme court's definition of cumulative with no double recovery.
It is undisputed that the Kulch decision furthered legitimate public policy
interest. However, some of the tools used to construct the decision, including
the creation of supportive legislative history and the issuing of threats,
probably should not have been used. The ends-justifies-the-means theory may
not be appropriate when writing a judicial opinion. In addition, the court left
a gaping hole when it neglected to clarify the recovery issue.
Regardless of its imperfections, however, the Kulch decision remains good
law and has applied to other wrongful discharge situations in the lower courts
decision. Furthermore, the supreme court has recently ruled, without an
opinion, that an employee allegedly discharged because of age can bring a
common law action for wrongful discharge in addition to her statutory claim
for age discrimination.8 From this decision it appears the court is recognizing
the plight of not only discharged whistleblowers, but also discharged
employees as a whole. By doing so it sends the message that mere statutory
relief is no longer sufficient.
5 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §4113.52 (Banks-Baldwin 1997).
6677 N.E.2d 308 (1997).
7 1d. at 329.
8 Livingston v. Hillside Rehabilitation Hosp., 680 N.E.2d 1220 (1997).
[Vol. 45:667
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II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND HOLDING
James Kulch (hereinafter "Kulch"), was hired in 1976, by Structural Fibers,
Inc. (hereinafter "Structural"), a manufacturer of tanks or "vessels" for use in
well water systems.9 In 1990, after experiencing various health problems, Kulch
and other employees orally complained to management, who informed the
complainants they could either do their job or find employment elsewhere. 10
In January 1991, Kulch filed a written report with OSHA who inspected the
plant ;he following April.11 While OSHA found that contaminants in the air
did not violate standards, several other serious violations were discovered. 12
As a result, OSHA assessed substantial fines against Structural.13
In his action, Kulch maintained that Structural retaliated against him with
physical threats, excessively writing him up (eleven times between June 7 and
October 7, 1991), forbidding employees to associate with him, and by secretly
videotaping him at work.14 Structural finally discharged Kulch on October 17,
1991, justifying the decision by stating that Kulch failed to performhis job
properly(allegedly indicated by the videotape) and falsely indicated on his
time card that he had performed work not actually completed.
Kulch filed a complaint with OSHA, which the agency eventually dismissed,
and a lawsuit against Structural and its parent company, ESSEF Corporation.15
Among the claims set forth, Kulch alleged violations of Ohio's Whistleblower
Statute (as embodied in section 4113.52 of the Ohio Revised Code),16 wrongful
discharge in violation of public policy, and negligent and intentional infliction
of emotional distress.17
The Geauga County Court of Common Pleas granted Summary Judgment
to Structural and ESSEF (collectively "Appellees") on both the Whistleblower's
Statute and the infliction of emotional distress claims. The court also granted
appellees' motion for Judgment on the Pleadings with respect to the claim for
wrongful discharge in violation of public policy.18 Affirming the trial court on
all issues, the Ohio Eleventh District Court of Appeals held that: (1) section
4113.52 of the Ohio Revised Code did not apply since Kulch did not make a
written report to his employer concerning the plant's unhealthy conditions, as





14677 N.E.2d at 311.
151d.
160HIo REV. CODE ANN. §4113.52 (Banks-Baldwin 1997).
17Kulch, 677 N.E.2d Wat 311.
18 1d.
1997]
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required by section 4113.52(A)(1)(a) of the Ohio Revised Code; (2) section
4113.52 of the Ohio Revised Code preempts a wrongful discharge claim for
violating public policy; and (3) there was insufficient evidence to sustain the
claims for infliction of emotional distress. 19 Kulch petitioned the Ohio Supreme
Court, which granted his motion for a discretionary appeal. In an opinion
written by Justice Douglas, the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the Eleventh
District only to the extent that it found no basis for the infliction of emotional
distress claims.20 The court held that (1) Kulch was afforded protection under
section 4113.52 of the Ohio Revised Code;2 1 and (2) in addition to the wr6ngful
discharge claim brought under section 4113.52 of the Ohio Revised Code, Kulch
was permitted to maintain a common law wrongful discharge claim for
violation of public policy against Structural.22
III. VIABLE CAUSES OF ACTION
The court first addressed the issue of the viability of Kulch's claim for
protection under Ohio's Whistleblower Statute. 23 Although agreeing with the
Eleventh District that Kulch's failure to notify his employer in writing is "fatal
to his claim for protection under R.C. 4113.52(A)(1)(a)," 24 the Court accepted
Kulch's contention that he was protected under section 4113.52(A)(2) of the
Ohio Revised Code. This section addresses the situation where the employee
becomes aware in the course of his employment of a violation of chapter 3704
of the Ohio Revised Code (Air Pollution Control Act), chapter 3734 of the Ohio
Revised Code (Solid and Hazardous Wastes Act), or chapter 6111 of the Ohio
Revised Code (Water Pollution Control Act) that is a criminal offense. 25 Under
section 4113.52(A)(2) of the Ohio Revised Code, the employee may directly
notify any appropriate public official or agency with regulatory authority over
the employer and the industry, trade, or business in which the employer is
engaged. There is no requirement that written notification be given to the
employer. The court agreed Kulch's complaint involved chapters 3704 and 3734
of the Ohio Revised Code, and thus, had a legitimate claim under section
4113.52(A)(2) of the Ohio Revised Code, availing him to the full protection of
the Whistleblower's statute.2 6 The court then remanded the claim to the trial
court for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.
19 Kulch v. Structural Fibers, Inc., No. 1995 WL 89963 at *4-6 (11th Dist. Ct. App. Feb.
10, 1995)
2 0Kilch, 677 N.E.2d at 329.
21 Id. at 316.
22 d. at paragraph one of the syllabus.
23 d. at 313-314.
24 1d. at 315.
25677 N.E.2d at 315-16.
26 The Eleventh District denied Kulch's claim under §4113.52(A)(2) of the Ohio
Revised Code, stating that Kulch failed to argue this theory in the trial court and was
[Vol. 45:667
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The court next addressed Kulch's proposition that in addition to his claim
under section 4113.52 of the Ohio Revised Code, he has an independent
common law cause of action for wrongful discharge in violation of public
policy. In support of his contention, Kulch cited the Court's opinion in Greeley
v. Miami Valley Maintenance Contrs., Inc..27 In Greeley, an employer discharged
an at-will employee after the employer received a court order requiring
garnishment of Greeley's wages for child support.28 Section 3113.213(D) of the
Ohio Revised Code prohibits employers from using a child support wage
withholding order as the basis for terminating an at-will employee and imposes
a fine for employers in violation of the statute but does not provide the
discharged employee with a private cause of action.29 The Greeley court
recognized a public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine and
held Greeley could bring a cause of action in tort against his former employer
for wrongful discharge. 30
In determining whether Kulch had a common-law wrongful discharge
action, the Court used a four-part test it had developed three years earlier in
Painter v. Graley.31 The test is as follows: (1) that [a] clear public policy existed
and was manifested in a state or federal constitution, statute or administrative
regulation, or in the common law; (2) that dismissing employees under
circumstances like those involved in the plaintiff's dismissal would jeopardize
the public policy; (3) the conduct related to the public policy motivated the
plaintiff's dismissal; and (4) the employer lacked overriding legitimate
business justification for the dismissal.32 The court found that both section
4113.52 of the Ohio Revised Code and 29 U.S.C. §660(c) embodied a clear public
policy favoring whistleblowing,33 and determined that 29 U.S.C. §660(c)
specifically prohibits employers from retaliating against employees filing
OSHA complaints. 34 The Court reasoned that public policy is jeopardized in
not allowed to assert it at the appellate level. The Supreme Court, looking at the language
in Kulch's complaint, found that while §4113.52(A)(2) is not specifically mentioned,
O.R.C. Chapters 3704 and 3734 and §§4113.51-4113.52 are, providing a reasonable
inference that Kulch raised a claim for protection under §4113.52(A)(2).
27551 N.E.2d 981 (1990).
281d. at 982.
29 See OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.213(D) (Banks-Baldwin 1997).
30Greeley, 551 N.E.2d at 986-87.
31639 N.E.2d 51(1994).
32 d. at footnote 8.
33Kulch, 677 N.E.2d at 321.
3429 U.S.C. §660(c)(1) provides:
No person shall discharge or in any manner discriminate against
any employee because such employee has filed any complaint
or instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding under or
related to this chapter [OSHA §651 et seq.] or because of the
1997]
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situations such as Kulch's, where an employee's reporting or complaining is
the motivating factor behind his dismissal.
After an indepth analysis, the court held Kulch could maintain what it
dubbed a Greeley claim against Structural for wrongful discharge in violation
of public policy in addition to a claim under section 4113.52 of the Ohio Revised
Code. 35 The court held "the mere existence of statutory remedies in R.C. 4113.52
does not, without more, operate to bar recognition of appellant's Greeley claim
for tortious wrongful discharge"36 in violation of the public policy embodied
in section 4113.52 of the Ohio Revised Code. 37
In addition to expanding the scope of Greeley, the court expressly overruled
its holding eleven years earlier in Phuing v. Waste Management, Inc.38 Dr. Phung,
a chemist, was terminated after he reported his employer for disposing toxic
waste in violation of the law.39 The Phung court held, in the syllabus, that: (1)
"Public policy does not require that there be an exception to the
employment-at-will doctrine when an employee is discharged for reporting to
his employer that it is conducting its business in violation of law;"40 and (2)
"An at-will employee who is discharged for reporting to his employer that it is
conducting its business in violation of law does not have a cause of action
against the employer for wrongful discharge."41 At the time of the Phung
decision, section 4113.52 of the Ohio Revised Code was not in existence. The
Kulch court conceded the Whistleblower's statute, which it believed was
prompted by the decision in Phung, effectively overruled Phung, but
specifically stated so itself "in order to avoid any confusion."42
Furthermore, the Court announced, "we also recognize a separate exception
to the employment-at-will doctrine where an employee is discharged or
disciplined for reporting health and safety concerns to OSHA and find this
exception to be applicable regardless of whether the employee had complied
with the dictates of R.C. 4113.52 in reporting such matters to OSHA."4 3 In other
words, the court's ruling permits discharged whistleblowers to maintain a
Greeley claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy in cases where
exercise by such employee on behalf of himself or others of any
right afforded by this chapter.
29 U.S.C. 660(c)(i) (1994)
35677 N.E.2d at 328.
361d. at 324.
3 71d.
38491 N.E.2d 1114 (1986).
39 Id. at 1115.
40 1d. at paragraph one of the syllabus.
41 Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus.
42677 N.E.2d at 329.
43 1d. at 328.
[Vol. 45:667
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the employee is precluded from bringing a §4113.52 claim because of
non-compliance with the requirements of the statute. The court seems to have
been swayed by the clear public policy it found both in both section 4113.52 of
the Ohio Revised Code and 29 U.S.C. §660(c).
After some repetitive justification for its decision, the supreme court finally
established that a wrongful discharge claim pursuant to Ohio's Whistleblower
Statute could co-exist peacefully with the same claim at common law: at least
until the issue of recovery arose.
IV. REMEDIES
In determining what causes of action could be maintained, the court held
that the existence of statutory remedies in section 4113.52 of the Ohio Revised
Code does not preclude a Greeley claim.44 In reaching this decision, the court
applied a three-part test regarding the remedies available to a discharged
whistleblower: (1) an analysis of the actual remedies provided by section
4113.52 of the Ohio Revised Code; (2) an analysis of the legislative history of
the Whistleblower's statute; and (3) an analysis of prior case precedent.45
The court's view of the remedies provided in section 4113.52 of the Ohio
Revised Code were immediately identifiable. "Clearly, the relief available to a
whistleblower under a statutory cause of action comes nowhere near the
complete relief available in an action based upon the Greeley public-policy
exception to the doctrine of employment at will."46 Additionally, at numerous
times throughout the opinion, the court draws attention to this insufficiency of
remedies in the Whistleblower's statute.47
The court carefully examined section (E) of the statute which specifically
addresses recovery.48 Section (E) allows for a court to order, as it deems
appropriate, reinstatement of the employee's position or a comparable
position, payment of back wages, full reinstatement of fringe benefits and
seniority rights, litigation costs, and reasonable attorney, witness, and expert
fees.49 In addition, if a court finds the employer acted deliberately in violating
the statute, it may include interest in the award of back pay.50
The court expressed concern with what it perceived as shortcomings
regarding remedies available in the statute as compared to those available at
common law.51 Some of these shortcomings the court acknowledged were, the
44 1d. at 324.
45 d. at 325-28.
461d. at 325.
47677 N.E.2d at 325-29.
481d. at 325-26.
4 9 0HIO REV. CODE ANN. §4113.52(E) (Banks-Baldwin 1997).
50 d.
51Kuilch, 677 N.E.2d at 325.
19971
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statute does not provide for the wide range of compensatory damages that are
available in a tort action for wrongful discharge and section 4113.52 of the Ohio
Revised Code does not allow the court to award punitive damages: only
interest on back pay in the case the employer was found to act deliberately.52
The court also voiced its dissatisfaction with the language "as it deems
appropriate" as possibly showing a distrust in the trial court's ability to
adequately compensate a terminated whistleblower.53 The Appellees argued
that the legislative history of the Whistleblower's statute indicates that the
General Assembly intended the statutory remedies to be exclusive.
The General Assembly enacted the first version of Ohio's Whistleblower
statute in 1988. 54 The Whistleblowe statute was then further codified in section
4113.52 of the Ohio Revised Code, presumably patterned after section 124.341
of the Ohio Revised Code, Ohio's whistleblower protection statute for state
employees. 55 After its original enaction, section 4113.52 of the Ohio Revised
Code was slightly modified.56 The Appellees argued that had the General
Assembly intended to allow additional forms of recovery, it would have
included express language pursuant to this intention in the amended version
of section 4113.52 of the Ohio Revised Code. While the court acknowledged
that the General Assembly considered and rejected a wide range of statutory
civil remedies for discharged whistleblowers, the Court determined that the
absence of express language is not dispositive of the question whether the
remedies in section 4113.52 of the Ohio Revised Code were intended to be
exclusive. 57
The court set forth two arguments supporting its conclusion that the
legislative history supports its decision. The court first stated that it found
nothing in section 4113.52 of the Ohio Revised Code or its history evidencing
the General Assembly's intent to limit whistleblower's remedies to those listed
in the statute. "Rather, on the basis of the information available, it is much more
reasonable to conclude that the General Assembly enacted R.C. 4113.52 to
remedy the defect in the law caused by this court's decision in Phung, but never
intended to preclude the future development of the common law of this state
in the area of whistleblowing."58
The court's second argument compared section 4113.52 of the Ohio Revised
Code to its ancestor, section 124.341 of the Ohio Revised Code. Although
521d.
53 Id. at 325.
54142 Ohio Laws, Part II, 3590-93.
5 5 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §124.341 (Banks-Baldwin 1997).
56 While the court does not specifically identify the modification, it does say that the
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similar, section 124.341(D) of the Ohio Revised Code expressly states the
remedy set forth in the statute is the "sole and exclusive remedy" available for
a qualifying whistleblower.59 Section 4113.52 of the Ohio Revised Code
contains no such language. The court noted the exclusion of a similar clause in
this specific provision of section 4113.52 of the Ohio Revised Code indicated a
lack of legislative intent to limit a terminated whistleblower's recovery to the
remedies in the statute.60
The court concluded its analysis of the legislative history by stating, that it
was not the intent of the General Assembly for the remedies in section 4113.52
of the Ohio Revised Code to be exclusive, and because of this presumption,
allowing a whistleblower to pursue common law remedies would serve to
encourage the legislative objectives of the Whistleblower statute. 61
The court, using case law precedent, discharged appellees' argument that
Greeley applies only where an employee is discharged or disciplined for a
reason prohibited by a statute which fails to provide the employee with a
specific remedy.62 The Court held that nowhere in Greeley is this contention
stated or implied and that it is not prepared to limit Greeley in this way 63
Citing both state and federal authority supporting the proposition that
section 4113.52 of the Ohio Revised Code preempts any common law remedies
for wrongful discharge, the court dismissed the case, considering the argument
to be "wholly inconsistent with the conclusions we reach here today that R.C.
4113.52 has no preclusive effect on appellant's Greeley claim for tortious
wrongful discharge in violation of public policy."64
The court did, however, take time to address one of its own decisions in
Fletcher v. Coney Island, Inc.,65 which held that "where the General Assembly by
statute creates a new right and at the same time prescribes remedies or penalties
for its violation, the courts may not intervene and create an additional
remedy."66 Fletcher was an African-American who was denied admission to an
amusement park, and seeking recovery pursuant to former sections 2901.35
and 2901.36 of the Ohio Revised Code.67 The Kulch court distinguished these
two cases, by stating that the Fletcher plaintiff had no cause of action in the
5 9 Id.
6O01d.
61677 N.E.2d at 326.
62 d. at 324-25.
63 1d. at 324.
641d. at 327.
65134 N.E.2d 371 (1956).
66 d. at 374.
6 7 1d. at 373-74.
1997]
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absence of the statute, whereas Kulch had a viable common law cause of
action. 68
The court gives final justification for its decision that the Whistleblower's
statutory remedies are not exclusive by stating in no uncertain terms, that "the
employment-at-will doctrine was judicially created, and it may be judicially
abolished.' 69 It seems the court is issuing a warning to further inquiries as to
its authority to interpret legislation in the area of not only wrongful
termination, but possibly at-will employment as a whole.
V. RECOVERY
Given the time and consideration the court devoted to establishing the
principle that a discharged whistleblower can maintain two separate causes of
action and is entitled to the remedies of both, remarkably little attention is
directed towards clearly defining exactly what type recovery should be made
available for the aggrieved employee. In addition, the actual time given to the
issue is as confusing as it is brief. The court expressly states that the remedies
available pursuant to section 4113.52 of the Ohio Revised Code for violations
of the statute and the remedies available for the tort of wrongful discharge are
cumulative.70 The next sentence, however, warns that the employee is not
entitled to double recovery. 71
Because the court gives no additional attention to the recovery issue, it leaves
undetermined exactly what the court deems to be cumulative, but not double
compensation. Moreover, the court's decisions in other similar areas of
employment compensation provide little guidance. Based on the Jones decision,
it would not be unreasonable to see whether "double recovery" language is
explicated in the court's decisions in the area of workers' compensation as a
guide for pinpointing the recovery a terminated whistleblower is entitled to.
The court decided in Jones v. VIP Development Co. 7 2 that an employee who is
injured on the job because of the intentional acts of an employer is allowed to
maintain a cause of action for workers' compensation (pursuant to section
4123.74 of the Ohio Revised Code) and a common-law action concurrently. So
then, the injured employee is entitled to recover from both actions and the
employer is not allowed to setoff one award against the other.73 The Jones
decision therefore seems to allow a "true" double recovery. Interestingly, in his
dissent, Justice Holmes vigorously addressed the issue by stating, "[i]f stacking
68 Kiich, 677 N.E.2d at 328.
6 9 Id.
70 1d. at 329.
7 1 Id.
72472 N.E.2d 1046 (1984).
73 Id. at syllabus.
[Vol. 45:667
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damages from two separate litigations for a single injury does not constitute a
double recovery, then our judiciary has misinterpreted the law for centuries."74
While Jones does not provide a complete model to follow, it does show a
distinct difference from Ktilch, and it appears as if some setoff may be allowed
by an employer who wrongfully discharges a whistleblower. Based on the Jones
decisions then, if Kulch was awarded back wages from both his statutory and
his Greeley claims, Structural would probably not be forced to pay both awards
but could set one off against the other, probably paying the greater of the two.
Because the Kuilch court stated that recovery under the two actions is
cumulative, this setoff by an employer would likely only be applicable where
the two awards are for the exact same action. For example, it awards from both
claims are for back wages alone, the company could probably setoff one award
for the other. However, back wages received under one cause of action would
most likely not be setoff against attorney's fees awarded under the other cause
of action.
Another possible interpretation of the court's definition of recovery may be
a hierarchical approach. Given the attention the court took to establish that a
discharged whistleblower is entitled to a common law cause of action and the
court's focus on a set of remedies offered by a Greeley claim, it is entirely possible
that the remedies awarded by this type of claim may be given some preference
over a statutory cause of action. Because the Greeley claim offers a wider variety
of remedies than the statutory claim, courts might first look at the damages
awarded under the Greeley claim. If the damages awarded under the common
law are sufficient in a court's view, then damages awarded under the statute
may be ignored. If a court, however, viewed any injustice in the remedies
awarded under the Greeley claim, then they could use damages awarded under
the statute to fill in the gap. It is quite possible that a court may act conversely
and grant preferential treatment to the statutory remedies and only apply
Greeley awards if necessary.
Even in the event one of these theories proves to be the actual intent of this
Court, difficult questions still remain unanswered. Will punitive damages be
offset by any interest awarded on back pay? Is the employee entitled to any
compensatory damages if he is awarded back pay and reinstated pursuant to
the statute? These are questions that, while not answered by this court in this
opinion, will have to be addressed by either this Court itself at another time or
by one of Ohio's appellate courts in the near future. This is the uncertainty that
was created by the Ohio Supreme Court's decision in Kuilch.
The decision reached by the court in Kuilch apparently did not come easy.
Nor does this decision appear to be a reflection of the views of the majority of
the justices. Justice Douglas filed the majority opinion and was joined by
Justices Resnick and Sweeney. Justice Pfeifer filed a separate opinion
concurring in the syllabus and judgment only. While the opinion is extremely
short and unclear in its purpose, Justice Pfeifer seems to advocate that a "wide
74 1d. at 1059.
1997]
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range of reasonable defenses" be available to an employer in order to offset any
unfair advantage that employees may gain by the courts' recognition of a
common-law cause of action for terminated whistleblowers. 75 Justice Cook
filed a separate opinion, in which Chief Justice Moyer and Justice Lundberg
Stratton concurred, agreeing in or supporting in the Court's decision to affirm
the Eleventh District's finding that there was no basis for the emotional distress
claim, but dissenting in the Court's reversal of the Eleventh District. Justice
Cook accused the majority of "elevating itself above the General Assembly"76
and acting "beyond this court's constitutional authority"77 in recognizing a
public policy claim in addition to the Whistleblower's statute. 78 In addition to
arguing that the remedy provided for in section 4113.52 of the Ohio Revised
Code is exclusive, Justice Cook's opinion also focused procedurally on the
appellees' summary judgment motion, stating that Kulch was unable to
withstand it.
VI. CONCLUSION
In the end, the Ohio Supreme Court did create a remedy for a wrongful
discharge of an at-will employee. Kuilch also accomplished the clarification of
Ohio's Whistleblower Statute by overruling Phung. The allowance of
concurrent causes of action serves a public policy interest that is embedded
both in statute and in public interest. Some of the convoluted tactics employed
by the Court in reaching its decision are questionable to say the least. It almost
appears as if the court, working backwards, reached a decision and then created
the necessary support around the decision. Some of the low points included
pulling favorable legislative history out of the thin air and threatening to
abolish employment-at-will in Ohio.
It is uncertain what the court intended when it provided such scant review
to the issue of recovery. Possibly the court would rather let the issue be decided
by Ohio's courts. Regardless, recovery is an issue that will need to be addressed
by some judiciary in the near future if whistleblower's rights are to be solidified
in Ohio.
The impact of the Kulch decision, however, has already been felt in other
areas of employment law. Four months after deciding Kuilch, the court again
reversed the Eleventh District in Livingston v. Hillside Rehabilitation Hosp.,79 and
ruled that a discharged employee who brought an age discrimination claim
pursuant to former section 4101.17(A) of the Ohio Revised Code 80 could also




79 Livingston, 680 N.E.2d at 1220.
8 0Renumbered section 4112.14 of the Ohio Revised Code by Am.Sub.S.B. No. 162,
effective October 29, 1995.
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maintain a Greeley wrongful discharge claim at common law. The court
reversed with no opinion, simply stating that the Eleventh District was
reversed on the authority of Kulch. 81 Interestingly, this decision seemed to
gather more support than Kuich. Five justices concurred, with only Justices
Cook, who filed an opinion, and Justice Lundberg Stratton, who concurred in
Justice Cook's opinion, dissenting.
The court seems to be sending a message: statutory relief is not enough to
adequately compensate the wrongfully discharged employee. The court in
Livingston did not even delve into an analysis of the adequacy of the remedies
provided by the age discrimination statute. It appears as if the court is prepared
to allow the discharged employee to maintain concurrent causes of action, both
statutory and common law, where they are available. However, in addition to
sending this message, the court is also creating enormous questions as to
recovery. While the court may be furthering policy objectives in employment
law, and specifically, wrongful termination, this creates an even greater need
for the court to address properly the issue of recovery so that Ohio's courts can
have a uniform approach to recovery of damages where concurrent causes of
action exist. The court's decision in Kzlch has clearly told Ohio's courts what
causes of action apply, but it has left out exactly how to apply them. The
Eleventh District, in particular, is curious to know.
81Livingston, 680 N.E.2d at 1220.
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